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The Preamble to the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct
provides, "[v]iolation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action
nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been
breached .... [The Rules] are not designed to be a basis of civil liabil-
ity." In a legal malpractice action, the plaintiff is not required to prove
that the defendant attorney violated the North Carolina Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct,' nor will such a showing alone give rise to a cause of
action.
The converse, however, is not true. When a lawyer has acted negli-
gently in representing his client such that the client has a cause of action
* This paper was originally presented as a manuscript for one portion of a CLE program
entitled "Legal Ethics" presented at NCCU School of Law on March 30, 1990.
t J.D. & M.L.S. NCCU, Assistant Dean for the Evening Program and Assistant Professor,
NCCU School of Law.
1. The North Carolina Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted in 1974. It consisted
of canons (statements of axiomatic norms), ethical considerations (objectives, aspirational in charac-
ter), and disciplinary rules (mandatory, violation of which led to disciplinary proceedings). Follow-
ing several amendments to the Code, the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct (hereinafter
N.C. Rules) were promulgated in 1985 and superseded the earlier Code.
The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted the American Bar Association's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (hereinafter Model Rules) on August 2, 1983. The forerunner
to the Model Rules was the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility (herein-
after Model Code). The Model Code was divided into canons, ethical considerations (EC's) and
1
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against the lawyer for malpractice, the lawyer has almost invariably vio-
lated the Rules of Professional Conduct.2 If nothing else, he has failed to
represent his client competently as required by Canon VI of the North
Carolina Rules.
Many ethical considerations arise in the area of legal malpractice; from
those concerning attempts to avoid malpractice claims to those concern-
ing how to deal with malpractice once it has occurred. These considera-
tions will be addressed throughout this article. Related topics such as
breach of fiduciary duty, maintenance of trust accounts, overzealously
representing a client, concealing evidence, and excessive attorney's fees
are beyond the scope of this article and therefore will not be addressed,
except as they relate to malpractice and ethical considerations.
By way of introduction, the issue of what constitutes legal malpractice
was definitively decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court in 1954 in
Hodges v. Carter.3 The court, in a much quoted passage, said:
Ordinarily when an attorney engages in the practice of the law and
contracts to prosecute an action on behalf of his client, he impliedly rep-
resents that (1) he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill, and
ability necessary to the practice of his profession and which others simi-
larly situated ordinarily possess; (2) he will exert his best judgment in the
prosecution of the litigation entrusted to him; and (3) he will exercise
reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the use of his skill and in
the application of his knowledge to his client's cause.
An attorney who acts in good faith and in an honest belief that his
advice and acts are well founded and in the best interest of his client is
not answerable for a mere error of judgment or for a mistake in a point of
law which has not been settled by the court of last resort in his State and
on which reasonable doubt may be entertained by well-informed
attorneys.
Conversely, he is answerable in damages for any loss to his client
disciplinary rules (DR's). The Model Rules consist only of the rules themselves and the official
comment.
Although the N.C. Rules are in large part patterned after the Model Rules, the N.C. Rules include
both canons and rules.
"CPR" signifies an ethics opinion rendered while the N.C. Code was in force. "RPC" signifies an
ethics opinion rendered after the adoption of the N.C. Rules.
2. For detailed listings of cases dealing with an attorney's negligence, inattention or profes-
sional incompetence as grounds for disciplinary action, see the following A.L.R. annotations: 69
A.L.R.4th 410 (1989) (criminal matters); 68 A.L.R.4th 694 (1989 & Supp. 1989) (personal injury or
property damage actions); 67 A.L.R.4th 415 (1989 & Supp. 1989) (family law matters); 66
A.L.R.4th 342 (1988 & Supp. 1989) (estate or probate matters); 66 A.L.R.4th 314 (1988 & Supp.
1989) (tax matters); 65 A.L.R.4th 24 (1988 & Supp. 1989) (matters involving real-estate transac-
tions); 63 A.L.R.4th 656 (1988 & Supp. 1989) (matters involving formation or dissolution of busi-
ness organization); 21 A.L.R.4th 76 (1983 & Supp. 1989) (delay in handling decedent's estate); 92
A.L.R.3d 655 (1979 & Supp. 1990) (conduct of attorney in capacity of executor or administrator of
decedent's estate); 45 A.L.R.2d 5 (1956, Later Case Service 1980 & Supp. 1990) (preparing or con-
ducting litigation).
3. 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144.
2
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which proximately results from a want of that degree of knowledge and
skill ordinarily possessed by others of his profession similarly situated, or
from the omission to use reasonable care and diligence, or from the fail-
ure to exercise in good faith his best judgment in attending to the litiga-
tion committed to his care.4
In a legal malpractice case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving "by
the greater weight of the evidence: (1) that the attorney breached the
duties owed to his client, as set forth by Hodges, and that this negligence
(2) proximately caused (3) damage to the plaintiff."'
Once a plaintiff client has established a valid malpractice claim against
his attorney,6 he has also established the attorney's violation of one or
more Rules of Professional Conduct.' It is not necessary to prove that
the attorney acted willfully or dishonestly in order to establish an ethical
violation.' "It is well settled that an attorney's negligence, inattention, or
incompetence in connection with handling the legal affairs of a client is a
ground for disciplinary action, even if the conduct was neither willful nor
dishonest."9 Once a violation is brought to the attention of the appropri-
ate disciplinary or investigatory committee of the state bar, and that
committee determines that a violation has occurred, the only question
remaining is what discipline will be imposed.
Discipline imposed for negligence in handling a client's affairs has
ranged from disbarment to suspension to censure.'0 Generally, the level
4. Id. at 519-20, 80 S.E.2d at 145-46 (citations omitted).
5. Rorrer v. Cooke, 313 N.C. 338, 355, 329 S.E.2d 355, 366 (1985) (citations omitted).
6. "The most frequent [malpractice] claims arise from blown statutes and notices, failure to
communicate an offer, alleged inadequate settlement and dismissal for want of prosecution. Referral
and withdrawal disputes are close behind." Gary A. Grasso, How to Keep Your Clients From Suing
You, 75 A.B.A. J. 98, 98 (1989). While many persons may believe the high-risk areas for malprac-
tice claims are business and tax related, "[p]robably no area of legal work has more, or deeper,
malpractice risks than the divorce and child-custody specialties." Id. at 102.
7. Eg., N.C. Rule 6(B)(3) requires an attorney to "[a]ct with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing the client."
8. However, courts have occasionally said that simple negligence is not enough to constitute a
violation of a disciplinary rule. See, e.g., Gould v. State, 99 Fla. 662, 127 So. 309 (1930). In revers-
ing an order of disbarment, the Supreme Court of Florida said:
Malpractice is a broad term. It embraces every character of unprofessional conduct from a
petty trespass to a high crime. It may be either willful, negligent, or ignorant. It would be a
severe remedy to disbar an attorney for carelessness, inattention to duty, ignorance of his cli-
ent's rights, and the remedies to enforce them, or even for an occasional equivocation in an
effort to appear better informed and more alert than his client suspects, as it would be a precari-
ous thing to accept the version which a disappointed and covetous client might give of his
attorney's knowledge, activity, and character in the management of a case resulting in failure.
Id. at 673, 127 So. at 313.
9. Annotation, Negligence, Inattention, or Professional Incompetence of Attorney in Handling
Client's Affairs in Estate or Probate Matters as Ground for Disciplinary Action-Modern Cases, 66
A.L.R.4th 342, § 2 (1988) (citing 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attorney at Law, § 56 (1980)). The annotation
references Model Code DR 6-101(AXI)-(3).
10. See 66 A.L.R.4th 342, 348-49. See, e.g., People v. James, 180 Colo. 133, 502 P.2d 1105
(1972), cited in 66 A.L.R.4th at 350. The attorney in James had two prior private censures and a
one year suspension from practicing law. A 75 year old client hired the attorney to prepare a will
3
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of discipline imposed will depend on the facts and circumstances of each
individual case. The North Carolina Rules of Professional Responsibil-
ity "presuppose that whether or not discipline should be imposed for a
violation, and the severity of a sanction, depend on all the circumstances,
such as the willfulness and seriousness of the violation, extenuating fac-
tors and whether there have been previous violations."" Cases interpret-
ing various rules of professional conduct have developed several factors
that may serve to mitigate or aggravate the offense and therefore impact
on the discipline imposed.
Mitigating factors, those which would tend to lessen the discipline im-
posed, include lack of a prior disciplinary record, "personal problems or
financial difficulties of an attorney, health problems of the attorney or the
attorney's spouse, the attorney's psychological problems, the absence of
any intent by the attorney to profit financially from the misconduct in-
volved, the attorney's payment of, or willingness to pay, restitution, and
the attorney's remorse."2 The most common mitigating factor appears
to be the attorney's state of mind. Although the attorney's mental condi-
tion is never a complete bar to disciplinary action, it may serve as a miti-
gating factor to reduce the severity of the penalty imposed. 3
On the other hand, aggravating factors, those that would tend to in-
crease the discipline imposed against the negligent attorney, include prior
violations of the ethical rules,' 4 ignoring the client's requests for informa-
tion,' 5 the loss suffered by the client,' 6 and misrepresentation to the cli-
which the attorney failed to do during an eight month period despite repeated attempts on the part
of the client to contact the attorney. The Colorado court found the attorney's actions amounted to
gross negligence and ordered disbarment, rejecting the recommendation from the grievance commit-
tee that the attorney be indefinitely suspended. Id. at 134-35, 502 P.2d at 1106.
11. N.C. Rules Preamble: Scope.
The Rules presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on the
basis of the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in question and in
recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of
the situation.
Id.
12. 66 A.L.R.4th at 349-50. For a discussion of substance abuse as a mitigating factor, see
infra text accompanying notes 28-41. See also Annotation, Mental or Emotional Disturbance as
Defense to or Mitigation of Charges against Attorney in Disciplinary Proceeding, 26 A.L.R.4th 995
(1983 & Supp. 1989).
13. 26 A.L.R.4th at 1000.
14. 66 A.L.R.4th at 350.
15. Annotation, Negligence, Inattention, or Professional Incompetence of Attorney in Handling
Client's Affairs as Ground for Disciplinary Action, 96 A.L.R.2d 823, 843-45 (1964), superseded by 70
A.L.R.4th 786; 69 A.L.R.4th 410; 68 A.L.R.4th 694; 67 A.L.R.4th 415; 66 A.L.R.4th 342; 66
A.L.R.4th 314; 65 A.L.R.4th 24; 63 A.L.R.4th 656; 21 A.L.R.4th 75; 92 A.L.R.3d 655.
16. 96 A.L.R.2d 823, 848-50. Such a loss can be financial or can be the loss of rights, such as
may occur upon entry of a default judgment. Other rights that may be lost include the right to a
cause of action when the attorney misses the statute of limitations and the right to appeal when the
attorney misses a deadline in the appellate process, such as filing the notice of appeal or record on
appeal. Id. Note, however, that attorneys have been subject to discipline even when the client suf-
fered no loss. See cases cited id. at 850-51.
4
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ent or to the court regarding the status of a matter for which the attorney
was retained to represent the client.' 7
Unlike malpractice actions, there is no statute of limitations for disci-
plinary proceedings. In North Carolina State Bar v. Temple,"8 the attor-
ney was accused of trafficking in counterfeit money, fraudulently
procuring the signature of a witness to a will after the testator's death,
presenting fraudulent affidavits to the clerk of court, and fraudulently
altering and recording a note and deed of trust payable to the attorney.
A disciplinary action was commenced against the attorney four years af-
ter the alleged offenses.' 9 The attorney argued to the court of appeals
that the disciplinary proceedings should be dismissed based on the stat-
ute of limitations. The court responded:
The plea of the statute of limitations is not available to respondent ....
[It is said:
"Disciplinary proceedings are not barred by the general statute of
limitations. Nor is a disciplinary proceeding barred because it is
grounded on acts that also constitute a crime that cannot be prose-
cuted in a criminal action because of limitations." 20
Disciplinary actions may be barred, however, when the attorney's due
process or other rights are compromised because of a lengthy lapse of
time.2' In such a case, the attorney has the burden of proving that his
due process rights have been compromised. The Illinois Supreme Court
has held that a ten year lapse between the offense and the disciplinary
proceeding did not bar the proceeding when the attorney failed to
demonstrate that the delay materially prejudiced his ability to present a
substantial defense to the charges.22
II. AVOIDING MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
Accepting the Difficult Case
Under Canon VI of the North Carolina Rules of Professional Con-
duct, "A lawyer should represent his client competently." Rule 6(A)
provides, "A lawyer shall not: (1) Handle a legal matter which he knows
or should know that he is not competent to handle, without associating
with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it. Competent representa-
17. 66 A.L.R.4th at 350-51. Misrepresentation may also constitute a separate offense for which
discipline may be imposed in addition to that imposed for the attorney's negligence. Id. See also
infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text (misrepresentation as separate offense).
18. 2 N.C. App. 91, 162 S.E.2d 649 (1968).
19. Id. at 92-94, 162 S.E.2d at 650-51.
20. Id. at 95, 162 S.E.2d at 652 (quoting 7 Am. Jur. 3d, Attorneys, § 62, p. 86, superseded by 7
Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys, § 89, pp. 157-58 (1980 & Supp. 1990)).
21. See 7 Am. Jur. 2d, § 90, pp 158-84.
22. In re Teichner, 75 Ill. 2d 88, 387 N.E.2d 265, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917 (1979).
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tion requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation."
An attorney who accepts employment in a matter which she is not
competent to handle without associating someone who is, not only vio-
lates Rule 6(A), but also sets herself up for a malpractice claim. This
does not mean that an attorney should not accept a case simply because
it involves an area of the law in which the attorney has no prior experi-
ence. If the attorney has adequately evaluated the case and the time re-
quired to handle it competently, she may accept the case provided she is
able to give it the necessary time and attention. Many times, the attor-
ney's diligent preparation can more than compensate for a lack of experi-
ence, and even under Rule 6, "[a] lawyer may accept representation
where the requisite level of competence can be achieved by reasonable
preparation."23
The best course of action for the lawyer is to carefully evaluate the
case in light of her own knowledge, experience, and time constraints.
The relevant factors in this evaluation are
the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the law-
yer's general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field
in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the mat-
ter, and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or con-
sult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question.
24
If the lawyer has some question about whether to accept a difficult case
or one in an area of law in which the lawyer has little experience, it is
wise to seek advice from more experienced attorneys. They will often be
able to enlighten the more inexperienced lawyer on just how much time
such a case may require and the likelihood of ultimate success. A
number of local bars have mentor programs whereby more experienced
attorneys provide assistance and guidance to new attorneys. Anyone in-
terested in learning more about the mentor program in a particular dis-
trict should contact that district's bar officers.
Contracting for Arbitration
The question here is whether an attorney can include in a retainer
agreement a provision that any dispute arising from the attorney's mal-
practice shall require arbitration. Although this precise question has not
been addressed, two rules give guidance to the attorney contemplating
using such a clause.
North Carolina Rule 5.4(A) provides,
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client if they
have differing interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to ex-
23. N.C. Rule 6 comment.
24. Id.
6
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ercise his professional judgment therein for the protection of the client
unless the client has consented after full disclosure. A lawyer shall not
enter into a business transaction with a client under any circumstances
unless it is fair to the client.
The comment to Rule 5.4(A) says that in transactions between client and
lawyer, "a review by independent counsel on behalf of the client is often
advisable."
A client's retainer of an attorney's services is a "business transaction,"
and a retainer agreement containing an arbitration clause would appear
to be a transaction in which the lawyer and the client have "differing
interests." If the lawyer negligently handled the matter for which he was
retained, the client would have a claim against the attorney for malprac-
tice. Once a malpractice claim arose, the lawyer's interest in keeping his
liability for any alleged malpractice to a minimum (possibly by keeping
the question out of the hands of jury) would conflict with the client's
interest in receiving the fullest damage award to which he may be enti-
tled. A client who entered a retainer agreement with a lawyer would
certainly expect "the lawyer to exercise his professional judgment... for
the protection of the client" within the meaning of Rule 5.4(A).
Nonetheless, if the client consents to the transaction after full disclo-
sure, Rule 5.4(A) allows business transactions between the attorney and
the client even when their interests conflict and even when the client ex-
pects the lawyer to exercise his professional judgment for the client's pro-
tection. An attorney who contemplates including an arbitration clause in
the retainer agreement should fully discuss with the client all ramifica-
tions which may flow from an agreement to arbitrate. For example, the
attorney should make it clear that if she negligently causes damage to the
client, the client may have a claim against the attorney for malpractice
but that under the arbitration clause, the claim would be decided by an
arbitrator rather than by a jury.
ABA Model Rule 1.8(a), regulating business transactions with clients,
permits such transactions only if the transaction is fair and reasonable to
the client, the terms are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the
client, the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent counsel, and the client consents to the transaction in writ-
ing. The Model Rule thus takes a more restrictive approach than North
Carolina Rule 5.4(A).
Rule 5.8 of the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct, also
relevant to this issue, provides:
A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the law-
yer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the
client is independently represented in making the agreement, or settle a
disputed claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former
7
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client without first advising the person in writing that independent repre-
sentation may be appropriate in connection therewith.
Rule 5.8 is almost identical to ABA Model Rule 1.8(h), except that the
Model Rule requires the attorney to advise the client in writing that in-
dependent representation "is" appropriate, rather than "may be" appro-
priate as provided under the North Carolina Rule.
Under Rule 5.8, the question arises whether an arbitration clause
would be "an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a
client." If so, the Rule would require that the client be independently
represented before signing the retainer agreement. At best, this would be
awkward and would put a strain on the attorney/client relationship
before it was even established. As a practical matter, an attorney who
includes an arbitration clause with respect to a possible malpractice
claim and who fully discloses the consequences of the clause to her client,
may very well lose the client before the retainer agreement is signed.
When the dispute between the attorney and the client is simply one
regarding attorney's fees, and the client has no malpractice claim pend-
ing against the attorney, it may be possible to submit the dispute to arbi-
tration even in the absence of an arbitration clause in the retainer
agreement. The North Carolina State Bar approved a Pilot State Bar Fee
Arbitration Plan and Model District Bar Rules on July 15, 1988.25 It is
thus possible to arbitrate disputes of fees if both the client and the attor-
ney agree to arbitration. There is no current procedure for arbitration of
disputes involving possible legal malpractice.
Communicating with the Client
Communication with the client is key to maintaining a good attorney-
client relationship. The North Carolina State Bar has said, "Poor com-
munication is the source of a majority of complaints filed with the State
Bar's Grievance Committee." 26  Poor communication with the client
can also constitute a separate violation of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct.2 7 North Carolina Rule of Professional Conduct 6(B)(1) requires a
lawyer to "[k]eep the client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with requests for information." The com-
ment to Rule 6 says, "The client should have sufficient information to
participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the rep-
resentation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent
25. The North Carolina State Bar Fee Arbitration Plan and Model District Bar Rules, 13 N.C.
ST. B. NEWSL., Summer 1988, at 12.
26. Professional Responsibility: Duty to Communicate, 13 N.C. ST. B. NEWSL., Spring 1988, at
1.
27. For a detailed list of cases where disciplinary action has been taken for failure to communi-
cate with a client, see Annotation, Failure to Communicate with Client as Basis for Disciplinary
Action against Attorney, 80 A.L.R.3d 1240 (1977 & Supp. 1990).
8
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the client is willing and able to participate." As examples of information
which should be immediately and fully relayed to the client, the com-
ment cites settlement offers in civil cases and proffered plea bargains in
criminal cases.
What can the lawyer do to help protect himself from malpractice
claims in addition to adequately representing his client in the first place?
It is imperative to build the client file. A thin file, even in a relatively
simple matter, offers little in the way of defense to either a malpractice
claim or a charge that the attorney has violated the Rules of Professional
Conduct by failing to competently represent his client. Decisions should
be reduced to writing. Correspondence with the client is necessary, not
only to communicate with the client as required by Rule 6(B)(1), but also
to document that the communication has occurred. Without such docu-
mentation, a malpractice claim may come down to a credibility battle
between the lawyer and the client. Such a risk is unnecessary and can be
avoided by keeping in touch with the client and documenting all
communication.
After the client has been fully informed, any important decision made
with respect to the case should be followed up by a letter to the client
setting forth the details of the decision. Notes should be made to the file
documenting each and every telephone conversation or office conference
with the client and the substance of the communication.
Substance Abuse
Substance abuse is a problem among lawyers as well as in society in
general. The responsibilities and stress associated with maintaining a law
practice may contribute to the problem. In 1977, the North Carolina
State Bar Disciplinary Hearing Commission determined that in the two
preceding years, sixty-five per cent of the cases that came before the
Commission involved attorneys who had substance abuse problems.2" It
is not clear how widespread the problem is in North Carolina, and no
empirical study has yet been conducted concerning substance abuse
among North Carolina attorneys. However, the State Bar of Washington
conducted a survey in 1987 that produced some alarming results. The
survey showed that twenty-five percent of the licensed lawyers in the
State of Washington had tried cocaine. One per cent admitted having
cocaine abuse problems. Eighteen per cent admitted to alcoholism.29
Because of the criminal implications, any use of illegal substances has
28. Ernest Machen & Edward Murrelle, Getting off the Ride: Positive Action for Lawyers, 36
N.C. ST. B.Q. 11, 11 (Fall 1989).
29. Stephanie B. Goldberg, Drawing the Line, 76 A.B.A. J. 49, 50 (1990).
9
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ethical consequences.3" Moreover, lawyers who suffer from abuse
problems often see the consequences in their practice. Work is not done
or is not done well or on time.
State bar associations and courts have dealt differently with the
problems of substance abuse. Some courts have allowed drug and alco-
hol addiction to serve as a mitigating factor when lawyers are disciplined
for misappropriation of funds or client neglect.3 The New York court,
for example, has allowed addiction to cocaine to serve as a mitigating
factor. In one case, the attorney was accused of misappropriating over
$12,000 in client escrow funds.32 The Appellate Division of the New
York State Supreme Court did not disbar the attorney, but instead sus-
pended his license to practice for three years. The court noted that the
attorney was in a state of cocaine-induced psychosis at the time he misap-
propriated the client funds.33 On the other hand, the California Supreme
Court has refused to allow substance abuse to serve as a mitigating factor
when the attorney is accused of misappropriation of client funds.34 Some
commentators go so far as to argue that drug abuse should be an aggra-
vating factor in disciplinary proceedings.35
North Carolina Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(B) provides that it is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to "commit a criminal act that re-
flects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects." The comment to Rule 1.2 says, "a lawyer
should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate a lack
of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving vio-
lence, dishonesty, or breach of trust, or serious interference with the ad-
ministration of justice are in that category." 36 However, neither the Rule
nor the comment directly addresses use or possession of illegal sub-
30. See Annotation, Narcotics Convictions as Crime of Moral Turpitude Justifying Disbarment
or Other Disciplinary Action Against Attorney, 99 A.L.R.3d 288 (1980 & Supp. 1990).
31. See, e.g., cases cited in Annotation, Misconduct Involving Intoxication as Ground for Disci-
plinary Action Against Attorney, 17 A.L.R.3d 692, § 6 (Supp. 1990).
32. In re Winston, 137 A.D.2d 385, 528 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1988).
33. Id. at 386, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
34. See, e.g., Twohy v. State Bar of California, 48 Cal. 3d 502, 769 P.2d 979, 256 Cal. Rptr. 794
(1989).
35. Hal Lieberman, Chief Counsel of New York's Departmental Disciplinary Commission for
the First Judicial District has argued, "rather than being a mitigating factor, drug use ought to be an
aggravating factor in disciplinary violations." Goldberg, supra note 29, at 50.
36. At least one North Carolina lawyer has been disbarred for conspiracy to manufacture, dis-
tribute and possess amphetamines. 77 DHC 11. "DHC" refers to the record of the proceedings
before the North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Hearing Commission. N.C. Gen. Stat. section 84-
32 (1985) requires the records of proceedings before the Commission to be preserved in the Office of
the Secretary-Treasurer of the State Bar. Final judgments of suspension or disbarment are also
entered on the judgment dockets of the superior court in the county or counties where the attorney
lives or practices law. Brief synopses of the Commission reports can be found in The North Carolina
State Bar, Lawyer's Handbook, Annotated Rules of Professional Conduct (1988) (commonly re-
ferred to as the Blue Book).
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stances as a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
3 7
The North Carolina State Bar has recognized that substance abuse can
be a problem. In July, 1979, the North Carolina State Bar created the
"Positive Action Committee" for the purpose of "implementing a pro-
gram of intervention for lawyers with a substance abuse problem which
affects their professional conduct."3 The Committee was given jurisdic-
tion to "investigate and evaluate allegations of substance abuse by law-
yers."39 The investigatory function includes conferring with the lawyer
and making recommendations to the lawyer regarding sources of help if
it is determined that the lawyer has a substance abuse problem. Unless it
appears that the lawyer is "engaging in conduct detrimental to the pub-
lic, the courts, or the legal profession," communications with the Com-
mittee are confidential.' If such a finding is made, the Committee is
empowered to take appropriate action, including filing a grievance with
the State Bar. This Committee has become known as PALS. Each issue
of the North Carolina State Bar Quarterly contains a list of PALS Com-
mittee members.41
III. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARISING AFTER THE FACT
The Duty to Inform the Client
North Carolina Rule of Professional Conduct 6(B) provides: "A law-
yer shall: (1) Keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(2) Explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. '42 The
comment to Rule 6 says, "A lawyer may not withhold information to
serve the lawyer's own interests."
If an attorney discovers that she has been negligent in representing a
client, the best course of action is to immediately inform the client in
writing of the error and the client's possible malpractice claim. Breach
of the attorney's duty to represent his client competently is only exacer-
bated by a failure to disclose the circumstances to the client.43 Failure to
37. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-28(b)(1) (1983 & Supp. 1989) also provides, "Conviction of, or a
tender and acceptance of a plea of no contest to, a criminal offense showing professional unfitness"
constitutes misconduct and grounds for disciplinary action.
38. Amendments to the State Bar Rules, 302 N.C. 637 (1979).
39. Id. at 637.
40. Id.
41. The ABA maintains a clearinghouse of information on lawyer-impairment issues, case law,
disciplinary agency procedure, and confidentiality and immunity rules. The clearinghouse can
reached through Donna Spilis, Director, Commission on Impaired Attorneys, 750 N. Lake Shore
Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60611. The phone number is (312) 988-5359. Goldberg, supra note 29, at 51.
42. These two provisions of Rule 6(B) are the same as Model Rules 1.4(a) and 1.4(b),
respectively.
43. See 81 DHC I (attorney who falsely represented to client that he had obtained signed judg-
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advise the client of the potential liability may result in further violations
of the Rules of Professional Conduct as well as additional causes of ac-
tion for fraud.
In a recent case before the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the affi-
davits of the parties filed at the trial court level tended to show that the
attorney filed a voluntary dismissal of the plaintiff's personal injury
claim without the plaintiff's knowledge or consent." When the client
later inquired about the status of the case, the attorney wrote a letter to
the client leading him to believe that the case was still pending and that it
simply needed to be rescheduled for trial. The attorney then failed to
refile the action within one year from the date of the voluntary dismissal
as required by Rule 41(a)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure.45
When the plaintiff subsequently sued the attorney for legal malprac-
tice, the trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant attor-
ney." The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision, not only
on the issue of malpractice, but also as to plaintiff's separate claims for
breach of fiduciary duty and fraud.
The court of appeals stated the elements of actionable fraud as follows:
"'(1) [A] false representation or concealment of a material fact; (2) rea-
sonably calculated to deceive; (3) made with intent to deceive; (4) and
which does, in fact, deceive; (5) to the hurt of the injured party.' 947
Moreover, where "a relation of trust and confidence exists between the
parties 'there is a duty to disclose all material facts, and failure to do so
constitutes fraud.' ,,48 The attorney-client relationship is one of trust and
confidence. The court of appeals held the evidence presented at the trial
level raised an issue of whether the attorney "falsely failed to inform
plaintiff that his case had been dismissed rather than continued; whether
that act was calculated and intended to deceive; and finally whether the
plaintiff was injured by the alleged false representation. 49
The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the decision of the
ment in client's behalf received one year suspension); 77 DHC 13 (attorney who failed to perfect an
appeal and failed to inform his client received public censure). See also Lerman, Lying to Clients,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 659 (1990) (thorough discussion of ethical considerations raised by an attorney's
mendacity).
44. Bamberger v. Bernholz, 96 N.C. App. 555, 386 S.E.2d 450 (1989), rev'd, 326 N.C. 589, 391
S.E.2d 192 (1990).
45. N.C. Gen. Stat. § IA-! (1983).
46. The trial court's ruling was based, at least in part, on a finding that, even if the defendant
attorney was negligent, his negligence did not proximately cause harm to the plaintiff since plaintiff's
underlying claim was not actionable as a matter of law. 96 N.C. App. at 559, 386 S.E.2d at 452.
This view ultimately prevailed in the North Carolina Supreme Court. 326 N.C. 589, 391 S.E.2d 192.
47. Id. at 562, 386 S.E.2d at 454 (quoting Vail v. Vail, 233 N.C. 109, 113, 63 S.E.2d 202, 205
(1951).
48. Id. (quoting Vail, 233 N.C. at 114, 63 S.E.2d at 206).
49. Id.
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court of appeals for the reasons stated in Judge Lewis' dissent to the
court of appeals opinion. 0 According to Judge Lewis, whether the cause
of action against the defendant attorney was fraud, negligence, breach of
fiduciary duty or breach of contract, the plaintiff had failed to establish
one essential element - that the claim against the original defendants
was valid."' The supreme court agreed, and the action against the de-
fendant attorney was dismissed.
Even though the defendant attorney ultimately prevailed on the mal-
practice claim, there is a lesson to be learned from Bamberger. An attor-
ney should keep the client fully aware of the status of any pending
matter. Although there was evidence in Bamberger that the attorney had
falsely represented that the case was still pending, the court of appeals
made it clear that, in addition to active misrepresentation, a failure to
inform the client of a material fact may also give rise to a cause of action
for fraud.5 2 Thus, the best policy is to fully and frankly disclose all mate-
rial facts regarding the client's case to him as soon as possible, especially
if those facts would tend to establish a possible claim for legal
malpractice.
Bamberger does not address the issue of whether the defendant attor-
ney violated any Rules of Professional Conduct and, if so, what discipli-
nary action should be taken against him. It is readily apparent, however,
that an attorney who lets the statute of limitations run against his client
and then actively misrepresents the status of case to his client has vio-
lated several disciplinary rules53 and that some form of discipline against
the attorney is in order.
Cooperating with the Disciplinary Committee
North Carolina Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 provides:
[A] lawyer in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:
Knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or
Fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known
by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond
50. 326 N.C. 589, 391 S.E.2d 192.
51. 96 N.C. App. at 563, 386 S.E.2d at 454-55. In the original action, plaintiff was injured
when he fell from a loft at his girlfriend's home. His girlfriend's mother owned the home, and both
the girlfriend and her mother were named as defendants. According to Judge Lewis, the case turned
on whether plaintiff was in his girlfriend's home as a licensee or invitee. In Judge Lewis' opinion,
plaintiff was a licensee as a matter of law. Since the only duty owed to a licensee is to refrain from
willful, wanton or intentional conduct, plaintiff could not recover from the original defendants nor
from the defendant attorney in the malpractice case. Id. at 564, 386 S.E.2d at 455. This case dem-
onstrates the "case within a case" nature of legal malpractice claims.
52. Id. at 562, 386 S.E.2d at 454.
53. E.g., N.C. Rules 1.2(C) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation);
6(B) (a lawyer shall keep the client informed); 7(A)(3) (a lawyer shall not intentionally prejudice his
client).
13
Solari: Malpractice and Ethical Considerations
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1991
178 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:165
to a lawful demand for information from [a] disciplinary authority, ex-
cept that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise
protected by Rule 4.54
Once the disciplinary committee commences an investigation of an at-
torney's alleged violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, it is vi-
tally important that the attorney cooperate fully with the committee.
Courts have held that failure to cooperate with the disciplinary commit-
tee may be an aggravating factor as well as a separate disciplinary rule
violation." Indeed, the comment to North Carolina Rule 1.1 specifically
notes,
it is a separate professional offense for a lawyer to knowingly make a
misrepresentation or omission in connection with a disciplinary investi-
gation of the lawyer's own conduct. This Rule also requires affirmative
clarification of any misunderstanding on the part of the admissions or
disciplinary authority of which the person involved becomes aware.
North Carolina General Statute section 84-28(b)(3)56 provides that
failure to answer a formal inquiry of the North Carolina State Bar is
misconduct for which discipline is appropriate. The North Carolina
Court of Appeals has held that an attorney violated section 84-28(b)(3)
when he failed to produce documents required under a subpoena issued
by the State Bar Grievance Committee.57 The court found that a sub-
poena issued by the Grievance Committee was a "formal inquiry" within
the meaning of the statute. 8
In jurisdictions that treat failure to cooperate as a separate disciplinary
rule violation from the underlying negligence, discipline imposed on at-
torneys has included disbarment, suspension, censure and reprimand. 9
In jurisdictions that do not treat noncooperation as a separate offense,
failure to cooperate or to respond to inquiry from the disciplinary com-
mittee may result in the entry of a default judgment on the underlying
54. N.C. Rule 4 requires preservation of confidential information obtained from a client. Rule
1.1 is virtually identical to ABA Model Rule 8.1.
55. See Annotation, Failure to Co-operate with or Obey Disciplinary Authorities as Ground for
Disciplining Attorney--Modern Cases, 37 A.L.R.4th 646 (1985 & Supp. 1989). See also Annotation,
Attorney's Delay in Handling Decedent's Estate as Ground for Disciplinary Action, 21 A.L.R.4th 75,
§ 2[b] (1983).
56. (1985 & Supp. 1989).
57. North Carolina State Bar v. Speckman, 87 N.C. App. 116, 360 S.E.2d 129 (1987).
58. Id. at 124, 360 S.E.2d at 134.
59. See cases cited at 37 A.L.R.4th 646, § 2[a]. Types of noncooperation that have resulted in
further disciplinary actions against the attorney include failure to answer communications from the
disciplinary committee even when the attorney appeared at the hearing, id. at § 6, p. 663, failure to
produce requested records, id. at § 9, p. 689, written or oral misrepresentation to the investigating
authority, id. at §§ 10-11, pp. 694-710, harassment or attempted influence of the complainant, id. at
§ 12, pp. 710-13, and harassment or attempted influence of a member of the disciplinary body. Id. at
§ 13, p. 713.
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charges.' If nothing else, the attorney's failure to fully cooperate would
indicate that the attorney was indifferent to a possible adverse determina-
tion of the proceeding. Full cooperation, on the other hand, has been
treated as a mitigating factor in disciplinary proceedings.6"
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court held in Spevack v. Klein that
the fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination applies to attor-
ney disciplinary proceedings.62 In Spevack, the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court ordered an attorney disbarred after he refused
to produce financial records subpoenaed during the course of a discipli-
nary proceeding.63 That court held that the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination did not apply to attorneys in disbarment pro-
ceedings." The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, 65 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.66 In reversing the order of disbar-
ment, the Court said that the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amend-
ment, made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment,67
"extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that
it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment
and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it."'68
Continued Representation after Malpractice
Rule 2.8(B)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct
mandates that an attorney withdraw from employment if "[h]e knows or
it is obvious that his continued employment will result in violation of a
Rule of Professional Conduct." Rule 5.1(B) provides that a lawyer
shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by... the lawyer's own interests, unless: (1) The law-
yer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected;
and (2) The client consents after full disclosure which shall include expla-
nation of the implications ... and the advantages and risks involved.
When an attorney negligently performs his duty toward his client, the
client may have a cause of action for malpractice against the attorney.
60. See, e.g., Loughry v. New York State Bar Assoc., 37 App. Div. 2d 187, 324 N.Y.S.2d 478
(1971), cited in 37 A.L.R.4th at 660.
61. 21 A.L.R.4th 76, 80-81. For a discussion of mitigating and aggravating factors, see infra
notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
62. 385 U.S. 511 (5-4 decision). See also Annotation, Extent and Determination of Attorney's
Right or Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Disbarment or other Disciplinary Proceedings, 30
A.L.R.4th 243 (1984 & Supp. 1989).
63. 24 A.D.2d 653 (1965).
64. Id.
65. 16 N.Y.2d 1048, 213 N.E.2d 457, 266 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1965), modified and aff'd on reh'g, 17
N.Y.2d 490, 214 N.E.2d 373, 267 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1966).
66. 383 U.S. 942 (1966)
67. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)(5-4 decision) (self-incrimination clause of fifth
amendment applicable to states by reason of fourteenth amendment).
68. 385 U.S. at 514.
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After a possible malpractice claim has arisen, the question becomes
whether the lawyer's own interests may materially limit his representa-
tion of his client. Even though Rule 5.1 (B) does not address this specific
problem, the comment does provide, "If the probity of a lawyer's own
conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or im-
possible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice."
North Carolina CPR 112 addressed the situation where the plaintiff's
attorney had sued four defendants. One defendant was considering an
action against the attorney for abuse of process and fraudulent joinder of
parties in the action. The question was raised whether it would be ethical
for the lawyer to require the defendant to drop the claims against the
attorney as a condition of settlement. A second question raised was
whether it would be ethical for the lawyer to merely request that the
defendant drop the claim. The opinion cites DR 5-105(A)(2) for the
proposition that an attorney's personal interests should not be permitted
to dilute his loyalty to his client. The opinion states that before settle-
ment negotiations are completed, the attorney should:
inform his client fully of the asserted intention of one of the defendants to
sue the lawyer personally for abuse of process and fraudulent joinder of
parties and proceed with settlement negotiations only if the lawyer, in his
own mind, feels that he can loyally represent his client irrespective of the
claim against him personally.
The test, as set out in the opinion, reflects the same dual considerations
now found in Rule 5. 1(B). Once it has become apparent that a client
may have a malpractice claim against the attorney, the attorney clearly
has a stake in the outcome of the case, and the lawyer's representation
"may be materially limited ...by [his] own interests."69 Therefore,
when a possible malpractice claim has arisen, representation of the client
should be continued only after a full and frank disclosure to the client of
the circumstances leading to the possible claim and the advantages and
disadvantages of continued representation. In addition, the lawyer
should satisfy herself that her independent representation of the client's
interests will not be adversely affected by the knowledge that the client
has a malpractice claim against her.
Withdrawing from Employment
Withdrawal from employment is governed by Rule 2.8 of the North
Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct. The Rule provides guidelines
which must be followed if it becomes apparent that a claim for malprac-
tice may exist, and the attorney finds it necessary to withdraw from rep-
resentation, either because continued representation will violate other
69. N.C. Rule 5.1(B).
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Rules or because the client wishes the attorney to withdraw. Subsection
2.8(A)(2) provides that an attorney may not withdraw
until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the
rights of his client, including giving due notice to his client, allowing time
for employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and
property to which the client is entitled, and complying with applicable
laws and rules.
Once a potential malpractice claim arises and the attorney decides that
withdrawal from the case is necessary or advisable, the attorney should
fully inform the client that the attorney intends to withdraw and the con-
sequences of the withdrawal. The client should be placed in the best
possible position with respect to the matter from which the attorney is
withdrawing.
The attorney has an ongoing duty to protect the interests of his client.
If the attorney decides to withdraw from a matter or if there is some
question as to whether the attorney-client relationship exists, the attor-
ney should communicate fully with the client. Even before a complaint
has been filed, the attorney should not withdraw until he fully advises the
client of his intention to do so and the consequences of his withdrawal.
Failure to do so may result in violations of the Rules of Professional
Conduct and in liability for malpractice, as when the attorney withdraws
and the statute of limitations runs against the client's claim. North Caro-
lina State Bar v. Sheffield70 is illustrative.
The attorney was suspended from the practice of law for three years
following a grievance by a former client. The attorney represented the
client in a number of matters, including criminal charges for murder.
The administratrix of the murder victim's estate filed a wrongful death
action against the client, and the client's father contacted the attorney
regarding representation of the client in the civil action. Although the
complaint in the civil action was delivered to the attorney's office, he
never took action on the matter, and a default judgment for $200,000 was
ultimately entered against the client.
Following his suspension, the attorney challenged several of the griev-
ance committee's findings of fact. One challenge related to the finding
that defendant failed to advise the client that he would not represent him
in the wrongful death action after accepting the complaint from the cli-
ent's father. The attorney argued that either he had never accepted em-
ployment in the wrongful death action or, if he had, that he withdrew
once he learned that his client intended to perjure himself.7
The court noted that the attorney-client relationship "may be implied
70. 73 N.C. App. 349, 326 S.E.2d 320, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 117, 332 S.E.2d 482, cert. denied,
474 U.S. 981 (1985).
71. Id. at 357-58, 326 S.E.2d at 325.
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from the conduct of the parties, and is not dependent on the payment of
a fee, nor upon the execution of a formal contract."72 According to the
court, the dispositive question was not whether there was an express oral
or written agreement with respect to representation, but rather "whether
[the attorney's] conduct was such that an attorney-client relationship
could reasonably be inferred."73 Evidence presented at the grievance
committee hearing showed that the client's father had delivered the
wrongful death complaint to the attorney's office. Later, the attorney
wrote two letters concerning the wrongful death action to the client. The
first letter advised the client against filing a counterclaim in the wrongful
death action and suggested that the client file for bankruptcy. The sec-
ond letter said in part, "I do not see that I can handle this for you for a
number of reasons .... Please come by the office sometime this week or
next so we can discuss this." The court found that this evidence sup-
ported findings that the attorney accepted employment in the wrongful
death action and did not withdraw.74
Once the decision to withdraw is made, the attorney should follow the
rules of court with respect to withdrawal,7" should fully inform the cli-
ent, and should take all reasonable steps to protect the client's interests.
Such actions by the lawyer will avoid violations of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct and prevent a malpractice claim from arising after the
attorney's withdrawal.
Turning Over the Client's File
North Carolina Rule of Professional Conduct 2.8(A)(2) provides that
an attorney may not withdraw from employment until he has "taken
reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client,
including.., delivering to the client all papers and property to which the
client is entitled .... ." North Carolina CPR 376 requires an attorney,
upon request by a client, to turn over the client's file to the client or to
the client's new attorney regardless of whether the former attorney has
been paid in the case. The opinion cites North Carolina Code DR 2-
11 OA(2) which required a lawyer, before withdrawing, to deliver to the
client "all papers and property to which the client is entitled." The opin-
ion does not specifically address the situation in which the client requests
72. Id. at 358, 326 S.E.2d at 325.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 359, 326 S.E.2d at 326.
75. See, e.g., General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts, Rule 16 (1989). If
no action has been filed, the attorney should have the client sign an acknowledgement that the
attorney is withdrawing and that the attorney has fully discussed the withdrawal and its possible
ramifications with the client. But see infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
76. August 16, 1973.
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the file because he is contemplating a malpractice claim against his for-
mer attorney, but the same considerations will apply.
The opinion notes that many things in the file "may be necessary to be
kept for the lawyer's own protection." Although it does not indicate
what such items may be, the opinion does provide a list of items which
should be delivered upon request. Those items include papers and other
things delivered to the discharged lawyer by the client, correspondence
to and from the discharged lawyer with respect to the matter, and any
documents filed with the court. Notes made for the discharged attor-
ney's own future reference and study need not be turned over. The opin-
ion specifically indicates that it is not improper for the discharged lawyer
to retain copies of anything delivered to the client or his new lawyer.77
Even if the attorney may have acted negligently in a matter or believes
that a client may have a cause of action against her, she must deliver the
client's file to him upon request. For the attorney's own protection and
as an aid in any future litigation, however, she should retain copies of any
documents delivered to the client.
Providing a Second Opinion
Because of the publicity regarding attorney malpractice claims, clients
are generally well informed that such claims may arise. What can or
should an attorney do when approached for a second opinion by the cli-
ent of another attorney?
North Carolina Rule 7.4 provides:
During the course of his representaticn of a client a lawyer shall not:
(A) Communicate or cause another to communicate about the substance
of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the
other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.
The Rule does not directly address the situation where a client, already
represented by an attorney, approaches another attorney for a second
opinion. This situation is, however, directly addressed by the comment
to Rule 7.4:
This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer who does not have a client rela-
tive to a particular matter from consulting with a person or entity who,
though represented concerning the matter, seeks another opinion as to
his legal situation. A lawyer from whom such an opinion is sought
should, but is not required to, inform the first lawyer of his participation
and advise.78
77. The substance of CPR 3 is now included in the comment to Rule 2.8.
78. N.C. Rule 7.4 is an amalgam of N.C. Code DR 7-104 and Model Rules 4.2 and 4.3. N.C.
Rule 7.4 Editor's Notes. Model Rule 4.2 provides, "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented
by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is author-
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Several considerations are raised when an attorney is approached for a
second opinion. Every effort should be made not to interfere with the
original attorney-client relationship, and the second attorney should take
care not to use the consultation as a means of soliciting the client.
The most troubling aspect of this issue is the apparent conflict between
the comment to Rule 7.4 and Rule 4, respecting preservation of confiden-
tial information.79 Since the attorney-client privilege arises when the cli-
ent discusses the matter with the second attorney, Rule 4 would seem to
proscribe contact with the original attorney regarding the matter without
the client's express permission. However, subsection 4(C)(3) allows a
lawyer to reveal confidential information "when permitted under the
Rules of Professional Conduct or required by law or court order."
Although Rule 7.4 does not expressly permit revealing the substance of
the client's discussion to the original attorney, the comment does suggest
that the second attorney "should" discuss the consultation with the origi-
nal attorney. The best course of action is to ask the client if it is permissi-
ble to speak with the original attorney and then do so only if the client
gives his permission.
Should the attorney discover that another attorney has breached his
duty to the client and thereby violated the Rules of Professional Con-
duct, a duty may arise under North Carolina Rule 1.3 to report the viola-
tion to the State Bar. Subsection 1.3(A) provides: "A lawyer having
knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall in-
form the North Carolina State Bar or other appropriate authority."8 °
Rule 1.3 does not mandate that every violation of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct be reported. The operative word is "substantial," which
refers "to the seriousness of the alleged offense and not to the quantum of
evidence of which the lawyer is aware.""1
ized by law to do so." Neither the Model Rules nor the comments directly address situations where
the client is seeking a second opinion. However, since the proscription in Rule 4.2 against speaking
with a client who is represented by another attorney is limited to situations where the attorney is
representing someone else with respect to the subject matter, the Rule does not proscribe providing a
second opinion.
79. N.C. Rule 4(B) provides: "Except when permitted under Rule 4(C), a lawyer shall not
knowingly: (1) Reveal confidential information of the client, ...." "Confidential information" is
defined in N.C. Rule 4(A) as "information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable
law, and other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be
held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental
to the client."
80. Emphasis added. Subsection 1.3(C) provides that the Rule does not require disclosure of
information otherwise protected by Rule 4 (confidential information). Rule 1.3 is virtually identical
to Model Rule 8.3.
81. N.C. Rule 6 comment.
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In Williams v. Council of the North Carolina State Bar,82 the plaintiff
alleged that his attorney failed to perfect his appeal in a prior action.
Plaintiff sought injunctive relief requiring, among other things, that
counsel who file motions to dismiss for failure to perfect an appeal report
the failure to the State Bar. Plaintiff also sought a requirement that dis-
trict court judges inquire about the reasons for such dismissals in their
courts.
In reaching its decision, the North Carolina Court of Appeals relied on
DR 1-102(A), the equivalent to Rule 1.3. DR 1-102(A) provided, "A
lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a clear violation of DR I-
102 should report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority em-
powered to investigate or act upon such violation.""3 The court held that
plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim for injunctive relief. The
court said, "The allegation that these defendants knew that plaintiff's
attorney had failed to perfect an appeal does not, without more, support
the inference that they 'had knowledge of a clear violation of DR I-
102.' "84 The plaintiff had made no allegation that the defendants knew
his attorney had failed to perfect the appeal without plaintiff's knowl-
edge or consent. The court noted there were a number of legitimate rea-
sons why an appeal may not be perfected. 5
In light of Williams, should an attorney gain knowledge that another
attorney has acted negligently with respect to his client's claim or de-
fense, it may become incumbent upon the attorney to report the other's
negligence if that negligence also constitutes a substantial violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct. The duty to report is even more clear if
the other attorney, in conjunction with the negligence, has made false
statements to his client or failed to disclose the circumstances of the
negligence.8 6
Settling a Malpractice Claim
Rule 5.8 of the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct pro-
vides that an attorney may not "settle a disputed claim for [malpractice]
liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first advis-
ing that person in writing that independent representation may be appro-
priate in connection therewith." Once it is apparent that a malpractice
claim has arisen, the attorney should not make any attempt to settle the
claim until she has fully advised the client in writing that a malpractice
82. 46 N.C. App. 824, 266 S.E.2d 391 (1980).
83. DR 1-102 provided: "A lawyer shall not... [e]ngage in professional conduct that is preju-
dicial to the administration of justice."
84. 46 N.C. App. at 826, 266 S.E.2d at 392.
85. Id.
86. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text (misrepresentation as violation of Rules of
Professional Conduct).
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claim may exist and that it may be advisable to seek independent repre-
sentation with respect to settling that claim. Any attempt to circumvent
Rule 5.8 may result in disciplinary action against the attorney.
In North Carolina State Bar v. Frazier,8" after an apparent claim for
malpractice had arisen, the attorney's client requested the attorney to
withdraw from the case. The attorney prepared a release which provided
that his services were terminated and which purportedly released him
"from any and all liability and professional responsibility in these mat-
ters."'88 The State Bar Disciplinary Committee found, in part, "By hav-
ing his client sign the release ... the defendant attempted to exonerate
himself from or limit his liability to his client for his personal malpractice
in violation of Disciplinary Rule 6-102(A) [the forerunner of Rule
5.8. ''89 After reviewing the language of the release, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals found "that it [was] a clear attempt by defendant to
exonerate himself from personal malpractice. This is forbidden by Disci-
plinary Rule 6-102(A)." It is also forbidden by Rule 5.8 of the North
Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct.
Defending a Malpractice Claim
May an attorney reveal client confidences to her attorney or to her
professional liability insurer if a malpractice action has been or may be
instituted against her? Rule 4(C)(5) of the North Carolina Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct provides that a lawyer may reveal
Confidential information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client; to establish a defense to a
criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in
which the client was involved; or to respond to allegations in any pro-
ceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
This Rule has been the subject of at least two ethics opinions. In Pro-
posed RPC 62 (April 13, 1989), the following facts and questions were
presented:
Insurance Company A hired law firm N to represent client Z in a law-
suit. This representation of Z was provided under reservation of rights,
since Insurance Company A contended that various claims in the com-
plaint against Z were not covered by its policy. Z also retained private
87. 62 N.C. App. 172, 302 S.E.2d 648, petition for discretionary review denied, 308 N.C. 677,
303 S.E.2d 546 (1983).
88. Id. at 174, 302 S.E.2d at 650.
89. Id. at 176, 302 S.E.2d at 651. DR 6-102(A) provided: "A lawyer shall not attempt to
exonerate himself from or limit his liability to his client for his personal malpractice." The Editor's
Notes to Rule 5.8 point out that "DR 6-102(A), read literally, had the effect of totally discouraging
not only prospective limitations of liability, but also settlements of actual malpractice claims." Rule
5.8 has cured that problem.
90. 62 N.C. App. at 179, 302 S.E.2d at 653.
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counsel. Eventually the lawsuit was settled. Thereafter, Z sought to re-
cover damages against Insurance Company A for, inter alia, alleged inad-
equate representation of Z by law firm N. What confidences of Z, if any,
may law firm N reveal to Insurance Company A? Does the answer
change if law firm N is still representing Z for the purpose of getting an
escrow agreement signed as part of the settlement of the original
lawsuit?9'
Citing North Carolina Rule 4(C)(5), the opinion states that the lawsuit
between client Z and Insurance Company A is a "proceeding concerning
[Law Firm N's] representation" of Z. The opinion provides that it is not
necessary that Law Firm N be named a party to the suit, and the firm
"may therefore reveal confidences to the extent necessary to clear its
name of the charge of inadequate representation, but should take care not
to reveal confidences that are not necessary to its defense." 92 The opinion
further says that Rule 4(C)(5) applies to both current and former clients,
so that the law firm could ethically reveal client confidences necessary to
defend itself even while still representing Z with respect to the escrow
agreement.
In Proposed RPC 77,93 the facts presented were: Attorney B has rep-
resented Company X for a number of years in connection with tax and
other matters. It was discovered that Company X had failed to file cer-
tain information returns, which could subject Company X to significant
criminal and civil penalties. Attorney B could, in turn, be liable to Com-
pany X for any penalties assessed against it. Company X has not made
any formal claim against Attorney B and has not retained separate coun-
sel to represent its interests against Attorney B.
Attorney B's professional liability insurance policy contains the fol-
lowing clause:
V. Notice of Claim or Suit
As a condition precedent to coverage afforded by this policy, upon any
Insured becoming aware of any act or omission which could reasonably
be expected to be the basis of a claim or suit covered hereby, written
notice shall be given to the Company or any of its authorized agents as
soon as practicable, together with the fullest information obtainable. If
claim is made or suit is brought against any Insured, such Insured shall
immediately forward to the Company every demand, notice, summons or
other process received by that Insured ...
The Insured shall cooperate with the Company and at the Company's
request make available all records and documents and submit to exami-
nation(s) under oath by a representative of the Company.
Attorney B reports Company X's potential claim to Insurance Com-
91. 14 N.C. ST. B. NEWSL., Spring 1989, at 12.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. 14 N.C. ST. B. NEWSL., Summer, 1989, at 11.
23
Solari: Malpractice and Ethical Considerations
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1991
188 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:165
pany, but fails to disclose the name of Company X on the grounds that
such disclosure would constitute disclosure of confidential information.
Insurance Company hires Attorney C to assist Attorney B against any
claims asserted by Company X. Attorney C then asks Attorney B for
more information regarding the potential claim.
The questions presented were:
1. May Attorney B disclose the identity of Company X and other
relevant background information about Company X, such as the number
of its employees and nature of its business to Insurance Company with-
out obtaining Company X's consent?
2. May Attorney B disclose this information to Attorney C without
obtaining Company X's consent?
3. If the answer to (1) is no and the answer to (2) is yes, may Attor-
ney C then reveal the information to Insurance Company?
The opinion first notes that normally the identity of a client is not
confidential information. However, in this case, Attorney B had already
revealed the failure to file returns to Insurance Company. Therefore,
Company X's identity is confidential since by revealing its identity, At-
torney B would disclose its secret for the first time.
The opinion, citing the comment to Rule 4, says that a lawyer need not
wait until an action is filed against him before responding to a claim. On
the other hand, any disclosure should be "closely tailored to the attor-
ney's need to defend him or herself."94 The opinion provides that Attor-
ney B may reveal confidential information to Attorney C, but Attorney B
"should only reveal that which is absolutely required under the pol-
icy."95 Attorney C's primary responsibility is to his client Attorney B.
Therefore, Attorney C should not reveal information received from At-
torney B to the Insurance Company without Attorney B's consent.
The crux of this is that an attorney facing a malpractice claim may
reveal confidential information to her attorney or to her professional lia-
bility insurance carrier. That information, however, should be carefully
tailored to the end which justifies the revelation in the first place; that is,
defense of the malpractice claim. The attorney should be very careful
not to reveal any information not necessary to a defense of that claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nothing strikes greater fear in the hearts of practicing lawyers than the
thought of being sued for malpractice, except perhaps the thought of be-
ing disciplined by the State Bar. Although there is a plethora of litera-
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sued for malpractice, it does happen. That is precisely why practicing
lawyers carry malpractice insurance.
There is a great difference, however, between simple negligence such as
occurs when the wrong date is inadvertently entered in the tickler system
and an answer is not timely filed, and gross or willful negligence or de-
ceit. Faced with the possibility of a malpractice claim, the attorney
should do the honorable (and smart) thing. After the first call is placed
to the liability insurance carrier, notify the client of the error in writing.
Do whatever is possible to minimize the damage to the client. Offer to
return any unearned, or even earned, attorney's fees. If contacted by the
State Bar Disciplinary Committee, cooperate fully.
Most malpractice claims as well as disciplinary proceedings can be
avoided by following a few simple suggestions:
Don't take a case you are not prepared to handle.
Develop a calendar system and use it religiously.
Communicate with your clients.
Document your communication.
Return phone calls.
Guard your trust account with your life.
Don't overcharge.
Don't make promises you can't keep.
And don't ever, ever tell a lie.
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